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I. Introduction 
 
Following the corporate scandals of the late 1990s there has been an increased focus on 
white-collar crime, buttressed by the popular perception that white-collar criminals are 
not punished enough. Despite the long sentences that alleged wrongdoers like Jeff 
Skilling of Enron,2 Bernie Ebbers of Worldcom,3 and Joseph Nacchio of Qwest4 have 
received, popular opinion remains that the law is too lenient on these classes of 
offenders.5 The retributive impulse of the mobs baying for blood after Enron’s collapse 
was not sated by the untimely death of Ken Lay shortly after his conviction: they claimed 
that “justice had been cheated.”6 This societal turn to vengeance seems to be at the root of 
the creeping criminalization of conduct that was traditionally dealt with by other areas of 
the law, as reflected in the fact that of the approximately 3000 crimes in the federal 
statute books, over 1200 were created since 1970.7 Virtually every case of new legislation 
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 Andrew Weissmann & Joshua A. Block, White-Collar Defendants and White-Collar Crimes, 116 YALE 
L.J. POCKET PART 286 (2007). 
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 Convicted and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. See, United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d 
cir. 2006) (“twenty five years is a long sentence for a white collar crime, longer than the sentences 
routinely imposed by many states for violent crimes, including murder, or other serious crimes including 
serial child molestation.”) 
4
 Convicted on nineteen counts of insider trading and sentenced to six years in prison and to pay $19 
million in fines. See, http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_11782036.  
5
 Statement of Joseph Biden, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs, of the Committee of 
the Judiciary, US Senate, July 2002 (hereinafter “US Senate Hearings”, available at  
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/15may20031230/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/107hr
g/86740.pdf (“...the strange thing is when it comes to those who rob us with a pen, rob us with a pencil, rob 
us with their financial shenanigans, or they steal from us, to be more precise, they tend to go to jail less 
than someone who would steal the same amount of money from us in a circumstance where they broke into 
our house.”). See also, three local polls after Skilling’s conviction and sentencing showing that 46% 
thought that his sentence was “not tough enough”; 38% thought it was “too lenient”; and 40% thought that 
“he deserves more time”. 
6
 See also, statement by one of the jurors: “I feel bad for the people who really wanted to see him go to jail, 
that they needed the closure and they’re not going to get it. You would hope [it] would be enough that … 
we came back guilty.” 
7
 See, Report of the ABA Task Force on Federalizing Criminal Law, available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/legislation/overcriminalization/$FILE/fedcrimlaw2.pdf (83% of all federal 
criminal statutes have been enacted since 1930, and almost 40% of all federal criminal statutes have been 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499256
Skilling –criminalization draft- SG 2 
aimed at behavior modification seems to entail shrill claims about the need for 
criminalization, upon the pretext that civil sanctions do not pack enough punch.8 The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is just one example of this phenomenon, enhancing existing 
penalties and creating new criminal offences in the wake of the collapse of Enron.9 
Creeping criminalization has serious ramifications: it undermines the coercive power of 
the criminal law, dilutes its expressive power,10 over-deters otherwise desirable business 
activities,11 conflates blameworthiness with imprisonment, creates incentives for 
prosecutors to abuse their powers, fuels an appetite for enhancing prison terms,12 and 
increases social costs. Most importantly, it punishes people for actions that are not even 
                                                                                                                              
enacted in since 1970.) For scholarship that discusses overcriminalization, see, John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “ 
Unlawful”  Mean “ Criminal” ?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American 
Law, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 193, 198 (1991) (criticizing the ever increasing tendency to authorize criminal 
sanctions for conduct that is “ indistinguishable”  from tort); Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: 
New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 Hastings L.J. 979 (1995); 
Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 Hastings L.J. 
1135 (1995); Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Toward a Principled Basis for Federal Criminal 
Legislation, 543 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 15 (1996). 
8
 Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness of Notice: Confronting “ Apparent Innocence”  
in the Criminal Law, 33 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 32 (1995): “In contemporary America virtually every 
regulatory scheme, particularly in federal law, includes felony criminal enforcement provisions to add “ 
teeth”  to the costs of noncompliance, covering such diverse areas as environmental safety, securities 
markets, employment practices, consumer protection, public benefits, and international trade. Estimates 
suggest that over three hundred thousand federal regulations are punishable by criminal penalties 
enforceable through the combined efforts of as many as two hundred different federal agencies.” 
9
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. See for example, Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
section 807(a) which states that any individual who knowingly executes or attempts to execute a scheme or 
artifice(i) to defraud any person in connection with any security of a registered or reporting company; or 
(ii) to obtain by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises any money or property 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any registered or reporting company is subject to fine and 
imprisonment up to twenty five years, section 1102, imposing a fine and a 2year maximum prison term on 
a person who corruptly ... alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or 
attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official 
proceeding; or ... otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, 
and section 906, which criminalizes CEOs for failure to make statements knowing that the periodic reports 
contain information that fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of 
operations of the issuer with fines of up to $ 1 million and imprisonment of up to ten years. 
10
 Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection into Legal Rules and the Problem with 
Environmental Crime, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 867, 883 (1994) (“The reason why criminal sanctions have 
greater deterrent value is also the reason why they must be used more selectively. Criminal sanctions 
should be reserved for the more culpable subset of offenses and not used solely for their ability to deter.”) 
11
 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 
Duke L.J. 1, 14 (1990). (“High criminal penalties will deter people from desirable, but only marginally 
lawful, activity because they are uncertain whether they will be convicted of a crime.”) See also, Steven 
Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1232 (1985). 
12
 John M. Darley, On the Unlikely Prospect of Reducing Crime Rates by Increasing the Severity of Prison 
Sentences, 13 J.L. Pol'y 189, 199-201, 204 (2005). 
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civil wrongs,13 let alone undertaken with the taint of moral wrongfulness.14 
 
This paper does not address every kind of white-collar crime (it does not apply to crimes 
like tax evasion, bribery, perjury, extortion, embezzlement and the like), and restricts 
itself to those involving corporate fiduciaries taking bad decisions at the expense of 
shareholders (corporate governance offenses). The arguments also do not apply to fraud 
as moral wrongfulness exists in that case.15 To the extent that the actions covered by this 
paper are blameworthy, I argue that this determination must be disentangled from 
punishment – which much of the legal scholarship in this area does not do. 
Disentanglement of blame from deserts suggests a via-media between criminalization and 
decriminalization – criminalization without incarceration. Accordingly, the legal process 
stops at the determination of guilt.  
 
My argument advances the criminalization debate in a novel way because it does not get 
bogged down in the irreconcilable quarrel about whether corporate governance 
misbehavior ought to be criminalized for deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation reasons, 
and whether it achieves any of these purposes. For these offenses, I argue that whichever 
theoretical justification underpins the decision to criminalize, imprisonment must not 
follow conviction. The conviction, despite the lack of incarceration, and the 
consequential sanctions likely to be imposed on the wrongdoer are sufficient to satisfy 
                                           
13
 Wendy Gerwick Couture, White Collar Crime's Gray Area: The Anomaly of Criminalizing Conduct Not 
Civilly Actionable, 72 Alb. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2009). (“the imposition of criminal punishment for conduct not 
civilly actionable risks disrupting the current scheme of securities regulation, at the expense of 
considerations deemed important by Congress and the courts. The lower materiality standard and the 
unavailability of the safe harbor in criminal cases may chill corporate disclosure and may affect what 
information reasonable investors rely upon when making investment decisions.”) 
14
 As the Enron Task Force Prosecutor was quoted as saying in the Houston Chronicle: “Defendants and 
suspects understand that if you’re selling drugs or if you rob somebody or if you take their car, that that was 
wrong…. But the issue we face first in Enron is, was this conduct criminal? When dealing with violent 
crime cases or even narcotics cases, that’s never a question. That’s always very, very black and white. Here 
we have to spend a lot of time figuring out what was done and figuring out whether that was a violation of 
the criminal law.”). 
15
 Stuart P. Green, Why it's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral 
Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1537 (1997) (“ moral wrongfulness”  …is present 
if the conduct made criminal is viewed by a consensus of society as immoral or in violation of a moral 
norm.”) 
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the three main justifications for criminalization.16 In appropriate cases, disgorgement of 
the offender’s gains will aid in the achievement of these objectives.17  
 
The model proposed by this paper would yield significant savings by reducing prison 
costs.18 It would also allow the state to take advantage of the disproportionate cost/burden 
of conviction on corporate governance offenders. Owing to the offenders’ high earning 
potential,19 deterrence can be achieved at lower cost by conviction alone because the cost 
of incarceration does not have to be borne by the state whereas the destruction of capacity 
to generate similar (or indeed, any) income has to be suffered by the offender even 
without going to jail.20 If the cost of incarceration is the same for offenders with different 
earning capacities, imprisoning those with very high earning capacities is a waste of 
social capital if the objectives sought to be achieved by incarceration can be achieved 
through other means. Further, the cost of a conviction can be predicted with sufficient 
certainty in the case of white-collar criminals by looking at their earnings history, and in 
many cases this can be a significant sum. Unlike the common criminal who may not have 
a similarly predictable earning capacity and therefore suffer the same extent of monetary 
loss from a conviction, this loss ought to serve the deterrence function without the need 
                                           
16
 To the extent that further action is necessary, there are alternatives to imprisonment: United States v. 
Clark, 195 F.3d 446, 452 (9th Cir. 1999) (probation condition preventing defendant from working in law 
office or “any institution in the business of providing legal services”); United States v. Whitlow, 979 F.2d 
1008, 1012 (5th Cir. 1992) (preventing defendant from working in used car industry); United States v. 
Burnett, 952 F.2d 187, 190 (8th Cir. 1991) (preventing defendant from working in business that requires 
travel or selling vending machines). 
17
 SEC v. Sands, 142 F.3d 1186; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 8093: “The district court has broad-equity powers 
to order the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains obtained through the violation of the securities laws. 
Disgorgement is designed to deprive a wrongdoer of unjust enrichment, and to deter others from violating 
securities laws by making violations unprofitable.” (internal citations omitted). 
18
 Incarceration is extremely costly. As one expert notes, “Between 1982 and 2006, direct expenditures by 
federal, state, and local governments on corrections jumped from $9 billion to $68.7 billion, an increase of 
over 618%. During the same period, combined criminal justice expenditures (for police, judicial, and 
corrections activities) by federal, state, county, and municipal governments rose from $35.7 billion in 1982 
to $214.3 billion in 2006.” See, Testimony of Prof. Stephen Saltzburg on Over Criminalization of Conduct 
and Over-Federalization of Criminal Law before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland 
Security, July 22, 2009, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Saltzburg090722.pdf.  
19
 A Wall Street Journal compensation survey of CEOs of 35large U.S. corporations in 2006 showed a 
median salary and bonus combined of $ 2,598,284, which included about $ 1 million in median base salary. 
See, The WSJ 350A Survey of CEO Compensation, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2007, at R1. 
20
 For example by bar orders against serving as officers and directors of companies such as those obtained 
by the SEC in numerous cases. 
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for the state to spend money imprisoning the offender. In addition to loss of earning 
capacity, clawing back ill-gotten gains significantly adds to disutility.21  
 
The paper is set out as follows: Part II briefly outlines the scope of the wrongs tackled as 
stemming from the principal-agent relationship in corporate law, and the inability of the 
law to overcome effectively problems resulting from the collectivization of the principal 
in that relationship. In Part III, I argue that conviction without imprisonment is a second-
best alternative to decriminalization in cases where the conduct is blameworthy, and 
results in non-consensual harm. Part IV demonstrates the disutility caused by conviction 
alone to show that the objectives of criminalization can be satisfied without the need for 
imprisonment. Part V asserts that consequential sanctions like shaming add to the 
disutility of conviction. Part VI ties the thesis to Skilling’s conviction for bad business 
judgment devoid of moral wrongfulness to illustrate the problems with conflating blame 
and punishment. Part VII concludes.  
 
II. Scope of the Wrongs Covered 
 
What is white-collar crime and why should it be criminalized? The oft-cited definition 
proposed by criminologist Sutherland - “those crimes committed by persons of 
respectability and high social status in the course of their occupations” – is now seen to 
                                           
21
 SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) (the purpose is to prevent wrongdoers from unjustly 
enriching themselves through violations, which has the effect of deterring subsequent fraud. . . . The 
emphasis on public protection, as opposed to simple compensatory relief, illustrates the equitable nature of 
the remedy.); Former United Health Group CEO/Chairman Settles Stock Options Backdating Case for $ 
468 Million, Litigation Release No. 20387 (Dec. 6, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20387.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, 
Former UnitedHealth Group CEO/Chairman Settles Stock Options Backdating Case for $ 468 Million 
(Dec. 6, 2007) (No. 2007-255), available at www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-255.htm. Section 304 of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides: “If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the 
material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement 
under the securities laws, the chief executive officer and chief financial officer of the company shall 
reimburse the issuer for--(1) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received by 
that person from the issuer during the 12-month period following the first public issuance or filing with the 
Commission (whichever first occurs) of the financial document embodying such financial reporting 
requirement; and (2) any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during that 12-month 
period. 
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be severely problematic.22 There is little normative justification for differentiating 
criminal behavior based upon the offender belonging to the privileged classes rather the 
hoi polloi.23 From the standpoint of the victims of the crime, social status of the offender 
has, at best, marginal relevance for evaluating harm and blameworthiness. Shifting the 
focus away from the offender’s social status to the quality of the behavior itself might be 
more helpful in formulating a definition. Viewed thus, white collar crime usually 
involves the behavior itself having the veneer of respectability and is mala prohibita24 
rather than mala in se.25 Frequently, the conduct at issue only invites attention because it 
was seen to be too aggressive by regulators, when the actors themselves only believed 
that they were engaging in legitimately risky enterprise.26  
 
This paper only focuses on a sub-set of white-collar offenders – corporate fiduciaries 
abusing the principal-agent relationship. The core arguments could be extended to other 
kinds of white-collar crime also because conviction without incarceration would satisfy 
the objectives of criminalization in many cases. The principal-agent relationship is 
pregnant with potential for abuse because of its inherently asymmetric nature. Agents are 
primarily employed in order to make up for the gaps in expertise, skill, and time that 
prevent principals from accomplishing the delegated tasks on their own. It is these very 
advantages enjoyed by agents that create problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
To be sure, these problems are addressed by the carrot-and-stick structures created by 
                                           
22
 E. Sutherland & D. Cressey, CRIMINOLOGY 40 (1974). In contrast, the FBI defined it as “[t]hose 
illegal acts which are characterized by deceit, concealment, or violation of trust and which are not 
dependent upon the application or threat of physical force or violence…” 
23
 See, Stuart Green, Lying, Cheating, 3 (“the strikingly broad range of moral judgments that surrounds 
such cases has less to do with the identity of individual defendants than with deeper moral ambiguities, 
confusions, and uncertainties that pervade our understanding of white-collar crime more generally.” 
24
 Black's Law Dictionary 956 (defining malum prohibitum offenses as those “which are made criminal by 
statute but which, of themselves, are not criminal”). 
25
 Black's Law Dictionary 956 (defining mala in se offenses as “wrongs in themselves; acts morally wrong; 
offenses against conscience”). 
26
 See Marilyn E. Walsh and Donna D. Schram, The Victim of White-Collar Crime: Accuser or Accused, in 
White Collar Crime: Theory and Research 32, 36 (Gilbert Geis & Ezra Stotland eds., 1980): “Instead of 
there being a clear consensus about the unacceptability of the conduct in rape and white-collar crimes, there 
is a tendency to view the conduct as associated with otherwise acceptable behavior. Thus, rape may be 
identified as behavior distinguished from approved conduct only by its location on the more aggressive end 
of a continuum of demonstration of sexual prowess. Similarly, many frauds and larcenies by trick or false 
pretenses can be viewed as excesses in what is normally accepted, aggressive salesmanship or shrewd 
economic behavior.” 
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principals – by keeping a close rein on agents and circumscribing discretion, co-opting 
the agent into ownership of the enterprise, tying incentives to the principal’s returns, and 
careful selection of the agent, principals try to ensure that they remain the masters of the 
relationship. When applied at the corporate level, the collectivization of the principal 
creates incentives for free-riding and rational apathy. Shareholders might have very 
different objectives even if they care to monitor management – ranging from the 
employee union shareholder’s desire to protect jobs, to large institutional investors’ focus 
on earning profits for investors. When they perceive management to be inadequate most 
shareholders prefer exit to taking corrective action. All these factors debilitate the 
monitoring power to a point where the agent is the de facto master of the relationship. 
Thus, although in theory the shareholders are the principals, it is the management that 
exercises the greater power, primarily because of real barriers to removal caused by 
collective action problems, and the deference that corporate law accords to business 
decisions taken by management. The question that this paper addresses is whether the 
problems that arise by virtue of agents abusing this relationship should be the subject 
matter of criminal law with imprisonment as the sanction, or are better suited to civil or 
social sanctions.27 Criminal sanctions have been used, for example, in the Skilling case, 
despite the prosecution framing the case in terms that invoke the agency cost problem.28 
This resort to criminal law has been justified on the plea that the principals are not the 
only victims of Skilling’s wrongdoing, but that his conduct engendered wider societal 
harm. It might also be evidence of the vicious nature of the retributive impulse following 
loss, even when some of it is the byproduct of consensual risk taking.29 Shareholders, 
employees, and the wider public feel the urge to punish those at the top for bad bets 
despite the absence of moral wrongfulness and the criminal law serves an instrumental 
                                           
27
 Larry Ribstein, Perils of Criminalizing Agency Costs, 2 (Ill. Law Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 
LE06-021, 2006), available at www.ssrn.com. 
28
 See closing argument by the prosecution: “[M]ake no mistake, they got wealthy…. And in exchange for 
that money, they owed their employees a duty, a duty of good faith and honest services, a duty to be 
truthful, and a duty to do their job, ladies and gentlemen, to do their job and to do it appropriately.” 
29
 Epithets used against Skilling included “pig,” “snake,” “evil,” “crook,” “thief,” “fraud,” “asshole,” 
“criminal,” “bastard,” “scoundrel,” “liar,” “weasel,” and “economic terrorist.” He was described as “dirty,” 
“deceitful,” “dishonest,” “greedy,” “amoral,” “devious,” “lecherous,” “manipulative,” “unscrupulous,” 
“despicable,” “equivalent [to] an axe murderer” who has “no conscience,” “stole from employees,” and 
“swindled a lot of people.” He was condemned as “guilty as sin,” for which “he needs to pay the price,” go 
to “jail for 20 years,” and “be hanged.” See, Skilling Appeal Brief, 134. 
Skilling –criminalization draft- SG 8 
function here.  
 
My arguments do not apply to offenses that involve regular fraudulent behavior with its 
usual mens rea requirements as criminalization is not problematic in those cases. I restrict 
my case to offenses where the defendants were probably acting in the belief that their 
conduct was legal. This is particularly plausible in cases involving the interpretation of 
complex accounting rules or risky business decisions. The problem with criminalizing 
such behavior is that the traditional purposes of criminal punishment – deterrence, 
incapacitation, retribution, rehabilitation, restitution – are ill matched with the results that 
principals seek. Principals’ objectives can be achieved at much lower cost either by social 
or civil sanctions without the need for the expenditure of state resources. The 
employment of the criminal law to agency abuses is particularly troubling when alleged 
offenders are incarcerated without the underlying allegations ever being proven, with the 
state content to criminalize for alleged obstruction of justice and the like. The cases of 
Martha Stewart30 and Frank Quattrone31 are illustrative of this trend.  
 
 III. Moral Ambiguity of White-Collar Crime 
1. Crime has to be morally blameworthy 
There has to be a fundamental distinction based on the moral blameworthiness of conduct 
if our distinctions between criminal and civil sanctions are to have any merit.32 
Misapplication of the criminal label to conduct that is not intrinsically wrong is 
counterproductive to the objectives sought to be achieved by criminalization.33 As 
                                           
30
 United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 280, 319-2(2d Cir. 2006) (affirming conviction). 
31
 Cite. 
32
 Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 201 (1996); 
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 
with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 69 (1996); Louis 
Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction of Criminal Law and the 
Regulatory State, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 97 (1996); Carol S. Steiker, Foreword--Punishment and 
Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 Geo. L. J. 775 (1997) 
33Paul H. Robinson, Moral Credibility and Crime, Atl. Monthly, Mar. 1995, at 72, 77 “As the label 
“criminal” is increasingly applied to minor violations of a merely civil nature, criminal liability will 
increasingly become indistinct from civil and will lose its particular stigma. In short, these critics contend, 
applying criminal sanctions to morally neutral conduct is both unjust and counterproductive. It unfairly 
brands defendants as criminals, weakens the moral authority of the sanction, and ultimately renders the 
penalty ineffective. It also squanders scarce enforcement resources and invites selective, and potentially 
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Professor Green wrote in a recent work, “[w]hat is interesting and distinctive about 
[white collar crime] is that, in a surprisingly large number of cases, there is genuine doubt 
as to whether what the defendant was alleged to have done was in fact morally wrong.”34 
This is a major problem, as Green recognizes, because “[w]hen there is a gap between 
what the law regards as morally wrongful and what a significant segment of society 
views as such, moral conflict and ambiguity are likely to be the result.”35 This sort of 
ambiguity severely affects what Professor Andrew Ashworth calls the “principle of fair 
labeling,” because it fails to ensure “that widely felt distinctions between kinds of 
offenses and degrees of wrongdoing are respected and signaled by the law, and that 
offenses should be divided and labeled so as to represent fairly the nature and magnitude 
of the law-breaking.”36 However, Green argues that white collar crimes correspond well 
to moral norms of a common-sense sort.37 He writes that “certain fine-grained 
distinctions in our criminal law are a reflection of equally fine-grained distinctions in our 
moral thinking, and vice-versa.38 Thus, white-collar crime doctrine that may at first 
glance seem puzzling and internally inconsistent can often be explained through 
reflection on the moral concepts that underlie it. And, by the same token, ostensibly 
baffling distinctions we make in our everyday moral lives can in some cases be traced to 
distinctions that first appeared, or are most clearly articulated, in the criminal law.”39 
Green, thus distinguishes lying from deception by arguing that, “merely misleading is 
less wrongful than lying because what I call the principle of caveat auditor, or “listener 
                                                                                                                              
discriminatory, prosecution. We should reserve the criminal law--the “heavy artillery” of our legal system 
…for conduct that reflects the traditional conception of criminality.” 
34
 Stuart Green, LYING, CHEATING, STEALING, 1 (OUP) 2007. (“a widely felt sense – expressed by 
judges, jurors, scholars, journalists, and the average citizen – that the law in this area involves a kind of 
moral uncertainty that distinguishes it from that which governs more familiar ‘core’ cases of crime.) Id. at 
1. 
35
 Id. at 46. 
36
 Id at 42. 
37
 These moral norms, according to him, “are fairly concrete. Although there will be significant 
disagreement over the precise content and application of such norms, almost every civilized person will 
have some rudimentary understanding that it is morally wrong, at least in certain core cases, to lie, cheat, 
steal, … Even people who have never had occasion to read a single page of moral philosophy are capable 
of making remarkably fine-grained distinctions about, say, what properly constitutes cheating or stealing.” 
Id. at 45.  
38
 “The divergent ways in which the offenses of perjury and fraud treat the requirement of deception 
…reflect deep-seated and fine-grained distinctions concerning the concept of deception that we make in our 
everyday moral lives.” Id. at 42. 
39
 Green, at 5. 
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beware,” applies to cases of merely misleading but does not apply to lying. Like the 
principle of caveat emptor, which says that a buyer is responsible for assessing the 
quality of a purchase before buying, the principle of caveat auditor says that, in certain 
circumstances, a listener is responsible, or partly responsible for ascertaining that a 
statement is true before believing it.”40 Green’s thesis posits that people are able to make 
moral distinctions between these offenses. He does not elucidate on how this transpires. 
Green seems to conflate common morality with critical morality in coming to this 
conclusion. As the Skilling case demonstrates in the following pages, it is unduly 
optimistic to suppose that public perceptions of moral wrongfulness are nuanced enough 
to separate conduct that is merely risky from that which is criminal, and the dangers are 
exacerbated in the context of corporate criminal conduct due to the infiltration of 
negative emotions like envy and resentment. The popular perception that CEOs and 
senior corporate executives are greedy and arrogant is probably at the root of the visceral 
reactions to news reports about alleged acts of wrongdoing. Given this fact, it is hard to 
see that common morality will be able to set aside these negative emotions when 
evaluating conduct for criminal sanctions. 
 
There is danger also from the imprecise and ambiguous nature - in terms of moral 
rightness or wrongness - of the conduct at issue in agency crimes. Given that there is lack 
of clarity as to what underlying moral norm has been violated by an allegedly criminal 
act because the precise complexities are hard to understand, there is likely to be a great 
deal of dissonance about moral wrongfulness and culpability.41 As Henry Hart writes 
“[w]hen a criminal enactment proscribes conduct which is malum in se, such as murder 
or manslaughter . . . the moral standards of the community are available always as a 
guide in the resolution of the indeterminacies, and there is a minimum of unfairness when 
doubt is resolved against a particular defendant. This guidance is missing when the 
                                           
40
 Id. at 78-79. 
41
 This is particularly the case with cases like Enron where complicated financial transactions were at issue. 
It is hard to imagine that the average person is able to appreciate the intricacies of the accounting treatment 
concerning the Enron Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) and the rules relating to off-balance sheet treatment 
with regard to the 3% at-risk rule. If the relevant actor believed that the SPEs did not have to be 
consolidated based on expert advice, where is the moral wrongfulness in the conduct? Besides, are 
accounting rules moral norms? 
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proscribed conduct is merely malum prohibitum.”42 Frequently, the conduct alleged to be 
wrong involves accounting transactions without any evidence about the offender’s 
expertise in accountancy. The accounting rules do not often have any moral element, and 
are explained more as coordination devices rather than as moral guidelines. They are also 
devices for standardization to facilitate comparison and in many situations are 
substitutable without moral choices being compromised. To be sure, there might be a 
minor moral value to adhering to rules without regard to the moral neutrality of those 
rules. This is particularly plausible when the rules are very precise and leave little to 
interpretation. The trouble is that when there is significant scope for interpretive leeway 
and consequent disagreement about what the rules require the moral value to rule 
obedience in of itself becomes weak. This is exacerbated when the rule obedience norm 
comes into conflict with competing values like self interest. This might explain the 
indifference of shareholders to accounting restatements by management as long as there 
is no negative impact on share prices.  
 
Moral wrongfulness is essential to criminalization for corporate governance offences; 
otherwise determinations about culpability rest only on ex post loss rather than from clear 
guidelines for behavior ex ante. As Green acknowledges, “we need to refer to the idea of 
[moral] wrongdoing not only in distinguishing among various offenses but also in 
deciding which conduct to criminalize in the first place, how offense elements should be 
defined, and what defenses should be available.”43 He claims that “without a clearer 
understanding of the relationship between morality and white-collar criminal law, the 
retributive principles on which the criminal law is founded are placed in serious 
jeopardy.”44 
 
                                           
42
 Hart supra note __, at 420. 
43
 Id. at 147. 
44
 Id. at 4 Professor Seigel argues in the same vein, “One of the foundational principles of the American 
criminal-justice system is that punishment is only appropriate if a person acts voluntarily and with some 
level of intention. The reasons for this principle stem from the two traditional purposes of punishment, 
retribution and deterrence. Retribution is the deontological notion that a person who commits a crime 
deserves to be punished. The converse of this proposition - employing retribution as a limiting principle - is 
equally true. A person who fails to act voluntarily (such as by way of reflex or subject to duress) simply 
should not be punished.” Michael Seigel, Bringing Coherence to Mens Rea Analysis for Securities-Related 
Offenses, Wis. L. Rev. 1563, 1566 (2006). 
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With regard to regulatory offenses, Green does not contend that it is wrong for the state 
to criminalize conduct that is not morally wrongful. He argues that “if violating such a 
regulatory statute constitutes rule-breaking intended to obtain an unfair advantage over 
another with whom one is in a cooperative, rule-bound relationship,” then the violation 
constitutes the moral wrong of cheating.45 Giving the example of insider trading, he 
writes that it is wrongful because it is essentially cheating, because the trader “(1) 
violates the SEC rule that one must either disclose material non-public information or 
abstain from trading; and does so (2) with the intent to obtain an advantage over a second 
party with whom she is in a cooperative, rule-governed relationship.”46 The basis of the 
abstain-or-disclose rule appears to be that investors must have confidence that the game 
is being played fairly, and that it is unfair that some traders who have privileged access to 
information should be allowed to make money off of the information. This is not as clear 
as Green would like to believe because there is a clear body of scholarship contending 
that insider trading is actually beneficial to the market because it facilitates more efficient 
pricing of securities.47 Further, it is unlikely that the person who is purchasing the 
securities from the insider is being taken advantage of in every situation. It is quite likely 
that the buyer sold the securities also before the information surfaced and caused the 
stock price to fall. In this case, the buyer is also profiting, rather than being taken 
advantage of as Green contends. If it is assumed that the argument is that the entire 
market is being taken advantage of, even that does not suffice as a strong case for 
criminalization because in many cases the insider’s transactions might be small in 
relation to the market for securities of the relevant company, with the result that the 
consequences are de minimis. Further, the chief complaint of the non-insiders is that they 
also did not have the opportunity to cash in on the non-public information, not that they 
were cheated. If they had been able to cash in, there would have been no complaint. This, 
again, illustrates the moral ambiguity of the alleged crime. 
 
                                           
45
 Green, supra note __ at 250. However, he qualifies this by writing that “harmfulness without 
wrongfulness is not supposed to be enough to satisfy the retributive demands of the criminal law. In the 
absence of a persuasive argument that lawbreaking per se entails some independent form of moral 
wrongfulness” he doubts that “criminalization can be justified.” Id. at 254. 
46
 Id. at 240. 
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Moreover, moral wrongfulness is not an automatic justification for criminalization: 
several morally wrongful acts might cause no harm in many circumstances involving 
consent. This is why the state refuses to criminalize such acts in situations involving 
consensual exchanges. Some scholars like Henry Hart have argued that criminalization 
should be reserved for conduct that is “intrinsically wrongful.”48 Similarly, Kadish has 
criticized the tendency to criminalize “aggressive business behavior,” claiming that the 
“stigma of moral reprehensibility does not naturally associate itself with the regulated 
conduct” in such cases.49 This impair[s] the identity of the criminal sanction and its 
ultimate effectiveness as a preventive sanction, both in the area of economic crimes and 
in the areas of its traditional application.”50 The fact that our perceptions about morality 
are capable of temporal change and that conduct regarded as morally wrongful or harmful 
during a certain time-frame might be regarded as perfectly acceptable at another time-
frame must give us further pause for thought when we see the temptation to criminalize.51  
 
2. Harm distinguished  
 
Horror stories of families being deprived of their entire savings and retirement plans by 
the actions of corporate executives has shattered the myth that white collar crime is 
victim-less, and that it is a different animal from common crimes.52 In some cases, it has 
been alleged that entire cities are victims of corporate criminal conduct.53 The purported 
economic costs imposed by white collar criminal behavior also have been cited as a 
                                                                                                                              
47
 Henry Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets and the Dog that Did Not Bark, 31 J. Corp. L. 
167 (2005). 
48
 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs. 401, 417 (1958) 
49
 Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic 
Regulations, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 423, 425 (1963). 
50
 Id. at 444. 
51
 See Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of 
Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 197, 221 (1965). 
52
 See, for e.g., Testimony of Janice Farmer, US Senate Hearings “They took more than my money and my 
dream. They destroyed my pride in my whole career. I am totally ashamed that I worked for Enron.”); 
Statement of Bradley W. Skolnik, Indiana Securities Commissioner, and Chairman, Enforcement Section, 
North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc., (“white collar crimes aren’t victimless crimes. 
Just like street crime, securities fraud ruins lives, destroys families, steals hopes, and kills dreams.”) 
53
 See Enron Task Force statement at Skilling’s sentencing hearing: “I want to talk a little bit about … other 
victims, Your Honor. Vendors who sold their goods and services to Enron suffered. Other businesses who 
relied on Enron suffered. Local economies where Enron did business suffered. Houston as a community 
was particularly hit hard by what happened at Enron.” 
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reason for adopting a hard line against offenders.54 Given the harm caused by white collar 
criminals, some believe that the privileged treatment accorded to them erodes the 
deterrent power of the criminal law because it signals that society treats criminals from 
rich backgrounds differently than those from poorer ones. Some prosecutors complain 
that judges are more sympathetic to pleas by corporate defendants to reduce or avoid 
incarceration, and that this affects their decisions to bring to trial offences that are more 
complicated and resource intensive than other crimes.55 Observers also claim that this is 
particularly lamentable because the deterrent objectives of the criminal law are 
particularly well suited to effective application against corporate defendants because they 
are usually educated, and commit their crimes after rational thought.56 All of these have 
coalesced to create a growing public opinion that corporate wrongdoers must be equated 
with ordinary criminals and that incarceration is necessary.57  
 
These justifications constitute the harm prevention model of criminalization - it is 
permissible to criminalize harmful white-collar conduct even if it is not morally 
wrongful. It is not necessary that the act should have also offended a moral wrong – it 
suffices that the offender violated a legal ban. Joel Feinberg's harm principle, for 
example, posits that: “[i]t is legitimate for the state to prohibit conduct that causes serious 
private harm, or the unreasonable risk of such harm, or harm to important public 
institutions and practices. In short, state interference with a citizen's behavior tends to be 
                                           
54
 One expert stated that the economic value of securities fraud alone is at about $40 billion, compared with 
$10 billion for street crime. See, Testimony of Glenn B. Gainer III, US Senate Hearings, supra note 1.  
55
 Statement of Hon. James B. Comey, Jr., United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, New 
York, US Senate Hearings (“they work to eliminate or reduce that jail time because of the defendant’s civic 
work or charitable work or his great employment record or his big family or his health problems, or a 
whole host of factors that the Guidelines say are discouraged…”) 
56
 Id. ([white collar criminals are]…more sophisticated than most criminals. They commit their crimes not 
in a fit of passion or out of addiction or a craving, but with cold and careful calculation. They are, in my 
experience, the most rational of offenders and are more likely to weigh the risks against the anticipated 
rewards of committing a crime.)”; See also, Statement of Hon. Jeff Sessions, U.S. Senator from Alabama, 
US Senate Hearings, supra note 1. (“I was a United States Attorney during the Savings and Loan fraud 
cases. I prosecuted Federal land bank fraud cases. My office prosecuted those cases that I supervised, and I 
am going to tell you there is a lot better behavior in banking today because people went to jail over those 
cases in the past. They lost everything they had, their families were embarrassed, and a lot of people started 
checking to make sure they were doing their banking correctly.”) 
57
 Statement of Glen B. Gainer, III, West Virginia State Auditor, and Chairman, National White Collar 
Crime Center, West Virginia, US Senate Hearings (“Our research section has found through our last 
nationwide study that most Americans view economic crime, or what we would consider white collar 
crime, to be every bit as important and deserve equal time and prosecution as traditional street crime…”) 
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morally justified when it is reasonably necessary to prevent harm or the unreasonable risk 
of harm to parties other than the person interfered with.”58 It is important to understand 
what constitutes harm. As is typically used in the criminal law, “criminal harm” can 
involve bodily harm,59 and social harm involving collective losses.60 The first kind is 
unproblematic and no one seriously disputes the validity of the state criminalizing such 
conduct. The second might also be acceptable in cases where the harm is non-consensual 
and involves third parties suffering without the ability to avoid the harm. However, no 
such necessity exists in situations involving agency problems as the principals have tools 
at their disposal to control the wrongdoers. There are perfectly adequate civil and social 
sanctions that can achieve the objectives – incapacitation, retribution, and deterrence - at 
much lower cost. Principals can act in concert, use regulators like the SEC, or through 
intermediaries like stock exchanges, and institutional shareholders to do all this without 
the need for the state to incur imprisonment expenses. 
 
Corporate crimes certainly involve harm – sometimes on a massive scale such as that 
caused by the bankruptcy of Enron. However, this harm is the price of capitalism and 
there are other mechanisms that can tackle it more efficiently. I contend that for conduct 
without the taint of moral wrongfulness, but where non-consensual harm results, 
criminalization without incarceration is a second-best alternative to decriminalization. 
 
Removing incarceration from the table also separates blameworthiness from punishment. 
To be sure, the state possesses advantages in determining blame, but its advantages in 
terms of punishing corporate governance offenders are less clear. If the high cost of 
incarcerating non-violent offenders outweighs the cost of other kinds of punishment, 
without corresponding benefits, scaling back the state monopoly on punishment to areas 
where it enjoys advantages might be advisable. Decoupling blame from punishment also 
recognizes the reality that conviction alone is sufficient punishment. Assuming further 
                                           
58
 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Others, 11 (1984). 
59
 See Robert W. Drane & David J. Neal, On Moral Justifications for the Tort/Crime Distinction, 68 Cal. L. 
Rev. 398, 409-10 (1980). 
60
 Feinberg, Harm to Others, supra note _, at 221-32. 
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punishment is necessary, state-punishment could be restricted to fines and impediments 
to holding positions involving trust.61 
 
IV. Conviction as a sufficient sanction: theoretical underpinnings 
1. Deterrence 
This section undertakes an exploration of the theoretical justifications for the deterrence 
value of conviction for corporate governance wrongs by comparing and contrasting it 
with the deterrent value of imprisonment. The most frequently advanced justification for 
criminalization is deterrence -- offenders will be deterred from committing criminal acts 
if the benefits from committing those acts do not exceed the probability of being caught 
multiplied by the cost of punishment following prosecution.62 Thus, a rational actor will 
trade off the expected value of committing the criminal act against two variables -- the 
probability of being caught, and the punishment after conviction. If the probability of 
being caught is rather low, the criminal act might confer value even if the punishment is 
high. The same principle applies if the punishment is low and the probability of being 
caught is high. These two variables are a function of the resources that the state possesses 
and determinations as to their optimal allocation. This vein of scholarship draws on work 
by Gary Becker, whose economics based approach, showed that stringent fines were 
preferable to imprisonment.63 Subsequent work building on this has important 
implications for this paper’s thesis. In an important article calculating the disutility of 
imprisonment, Polinsky and Shavell posit that there are three kinds of offenders -- risk-
neutral (offenders for whom the severity and probability of imprisonment has equal 
deterrent value), risk-averse (offenders for whom severity of imprisonment has greater 
deterrent value than probability of imprisonment), and risk-preferring (those for whom 
the severity of imprisonment has less deterrent value than the probability of 
                                           
61
 Gary Becker, Economics of Crime, J. POL. ECON. 193 (“probation and institutionalization use up social 
resources, and fines do not, since the latter are basically just transfer payments, while the former use 
resources in the form of guards, supervisory personnel, probation officers, and the offenders' own time.”) 
62
 Some examples of scholarship in this genre are Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment, An Economic 
Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169, 172 (1968), Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 
85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193 (1985), Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a 
Preference-Shaping Policy, Duke L.J. 1 (1990), Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of 
Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1232 (1985). 
63
 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment, An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 16 (1968). 
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imprisonment).64 Unlike them, I focus on disutility of conviction rather than disutility of 
imprisonment. This allows us to gain an understanding of the calculation that rational 
offenders might engage in even if there is no imprisonment sanction attached to the 
conviction. It also facilitates an analysis of the tradeoffs between the relevant variables by 
slicing the salami even finer than Polinsky and Shavell’s study does. 
 
To start our analysis, the probability of conviction is p, the length of imprisonment is l, 
and the total disutility is u. Total disutility is made up of disutility of conviction c and 
disutility of imprisonment i. Although other factors like age and social situation can be 
significant variables in calculating total disutility, for simplicity we exclude those factors 
and calculate u = p x [(l x i) + c]. Individuals with a high value for c are reputation-
conscious and those with a low value for c are reputation-indifferent. Consider the 
following scenario: The probability of conviction is 10 percent, the disutility of 
conviction is 200, and the disutility of any sentence length is 5, and the sentence is 10 
years. Then total disutility is .1 x [(5x10) +200] = 25. Now since the disutility of any 
sentence length is constant, increasing the sanction to 20 years will increase the total 
disutility to .1x [(5x20) +200] = 30. If, however, the disutility of any sentence length is 0, 
then total disutility is .1x [(0x10) +200] = 20. In this case, increasing the sentence length 
to 20 does not alter the total disutility at all (.1 x [(0x20) + 200] = 20). It is unlikely that 
the disutility of any sentence length is 0 for any rational individual; it is possible that the 
disutility of year 1 is very low at 1 (u = .1 x [(1x10) + 200] = 21), and thereafter declines 
in some proportion to sentence length to a point where the utility of a life sentence might 
move into positive territory.65 To explain, if an individual is sentenced to undergo 
                                           
64
 Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory 
of Deterrence, 28 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1999) (if the disutility from imprisonment rises in proportion to 
sentence length, then an increase in the magnitude of sanctions has the same effect as an equal percentage 
increase in the probability of sanctions. However, if disutility rises more than in proportion to the sentence, 
raising the magnitude of sanctions has a greater effect than increasing their probability by the same 
percentage amount. Conversely, if disutility rises less than in proportion to the sentence, raising the 
magnitude of sanctions has a smaller effect than increasing their probability.) 
65
 Professors Robinson and Darley and quote Kahneman to make a similar point: “The well being of prison 
inmates is likely to improve in the course of their sentence, as they gain seniority and survival skills... 
Suppose ... that prisoners apply a Peak and End rule in retrospective evaluations of their prison experience. 
The result would be a global evaluation that becomes steadily less aversive with time in prison, implying a 
negative correlation between sentence length and the deterrence of individual recidivism. This is surely not 
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imprisonment for 20 years at the age of 55, even if the disutility of the first year is very 
high, this declines as the person proceeds further into his sentence and ages because the 
alternative of being released at an old age, without any prospect of income or caregivers, 
might be more unpalatable than staying in jail. Similarly, if the sentence is life 
imprisonment, each year after the first might become more bearable and it might be 
preferable to die in jail. 
 
Now let us consider the case of reputation-indifferent individuals with a no disutility for 
conviction alone. Probability of conviction is 10 percent, disutility of conviction is 0, 
disutility of any sentence length is 5 and the sentence is 10 years. Now total disutility is 
.1 x [(5x10) + 0] = 5. Increasing the sentence length to 20 years results in a total disutility 
of .1 x [(5x20) + 0] = 10, doubling with the doubling of sentence length. This has 
startling implications. It shows that for the state to achieve the same disutility for this 
individual as the offender with the disutility of conviction of 200 and no disutility of 
imprisonment, the state has to imprison him for 40 years. Conversely, the offender with 
the disutility of 200 on conviction but no disutility on imprisonment can be deterred to 
the same extent even by saving money on prison costs for 40 years. Thus, sending both 
individuals to jail for identical amounts is a significant waste of money and fails to 
capture the savings offered by the disutility experienced by conviction alone. 
 
Similarly, tweaking the probability of conviction has the following consequences. 
Assume that the probability of conviction is 0.025, disutility of conviction is 200, 
disutility of any sentence length is 0 and sentence length is 10 years. Total disutility is 
.025 [(0x10) + 200] = 5. This means that this offender can be deterred to the same extent 
as the reputation-indifferent individual who is imprisoned for 10 years with a disutility of 
5, at one-fourth the cost of enforcement without even incurring the cost of imprisonment, 
i.e., by conviction alone. Thus, spending the same amount of money on enforcement for 
both types of offenders is a waste of money. 
 
                                                                                                                              
a socially desirable outcome.” See, Paul Robinson and John Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U.L. 
Rev. 453, 462 at fn.1(1997). 
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The above clearly demonstrates the benefits of focusing on the quality of individuals and 
their disutility of conviction. A policy that takes advantage of this characteristic 
possessed by individuals can achieve the same deterrence at lower prison cost and lower 
enforcement cost. Corporate governance offenders are more likely to be reputation-
conscious and have a high rate of disutility for conviction alone. This is because their 
very livelihood is tied to reputation. One study found that “[f]or  crimes  examined, 
ranging from insider trading to drug offenses to bank larceny, it is not uncommon to find 
that the highest income criminals suffer reductions in legitimate income of between 
eighty and ninety-five percent as a result of conviction.”66 If earning capacity is destroyed 
or substantially diminished, the conviction itself would satisfy the punishment function. It 
serves to convey information to society about the wrongdoer’s unsuitability to hold 
responsible corporate positions involving trust. To the extent that further deterrence is 
needed, it could be combined with other impediments to ensure that he does not have 
access to opportunities for re-offending.67 Conviction also triggers consequential 
sanctions like shaming by emboldening third parties to enforce social norms on 
offenders.68 
 
Given the high profile of the offenders, the information about conviction is likely to be 
widely disseminated ensuring that the relevant target group perceives the consequences 
                                           
66
 John Lott, Comment, Optimal Penalties Versus Minimizing the Level of Crime: Does it Matter Who is 
Correct? 71 B.U.L. Rev. 439, 442 (1991) ( “Collateral penalties imposed upon criminals, including the loss 
of licenses and the loss of legitimate income after returning to the work force, are significantly more 
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crime.” 
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 See, SEC v. Victor Posner, Steven N. Posner, and Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 6 F.3d 520; 1994 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 3329. The trial court held that the defendants had committed securities fraud, enjoined them 
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appeal, the court affirmed stating the court's conclusion that the officer and director bar was necessary to 
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 Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The Economics of Stigma: Why More Detection of Crime May Result in 
Less Stigmatization, 36 J. Leg. Stud. 356, 360 (2007): “Criminal conviction is clearly relevant for both 
willing stigmatizers and unwilling stigmatizers. The willing stigmatizers use conviction as a proxy for 
identifying offenders even if their real intended targets are offenders rather than those who have been 
convicted and punished. In contrast, unwilling stigmatizers do not use stigmatization merely as a proxy; 
their primary targets are those who have been publicly identified and labeled as offenders—that is, the 
stigmatized.” 
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of offending. Since the number of actual and potential wrongdoers subject to these 
prosecutions is relatively small (when compared to other crimes which can be committed 
by any member of the population, whereas these crimes can only be committed by 
corporate fiduciaries) saturating the relevant constituency with deterrent information is 
feasible and ensures that search costs are not significant. Had the pool of corporate 
fiduciaries been large, corporations would have had to expend significant resources to 
detect prior offenders and ensure that they are not given further opportunities to offend. 
This is not the case. In addition, executive search firms and other gatekeepers like 
professional licensing agencies already perform the detection function.  
 
To sum up, monetizing the disutility suffered by the white-collar criminal upon 
conviction offers clarity about the sufficiency of the punishment function served by 
conviction alone. It also allows for more efficient use of state resources -- the cost of 
imprisonment might be more effectively utilized on those who cannot be deterred by 
destruction of earning capacity alone because they have little to lose. Further, the ability 
to deter without the cost of imprisonment eliminates the social disutility caused by 
constantly ratcheting up sentences.69 It also frees courts from making fine distinctions 
about appropriate sentence length, with the risk of a jail lottery.70  
 
2. Retribution 
The case for criminalization of corporate governance offenders appears to be largely 
motivated by the retributive impulse. I do not undertake an exhaustive review of the 
literature on retribution here or suggest that retribution should not a factor in 
determinations about the need for criminal sanctions. The limited claim is that the 
retributive objective is satisfied by conviction alone given the unique position of 
corporate governance offenders. As discussed previously, these offenders value group 
membership, often tied directly to their earning capacity. Conviction frequently 
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 Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 
Duke L.J. 1, 14 (1990) (increasing penalties to prevent crime imposes costs on society in the forms of the 
mistaken punishment of innocent people, deterrence of beneficial but marginally lawful activity, and 
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 Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from Current White 
Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 165, 213 (2004). 
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extinguishes such membership and rings the death knell for a professional career.71 For 
example, if the offender is a lawyer, he may lose his bar license.72 The SEC may also 
suspend him from practicing before it.73 If she is the CEO of a company she founded, she 
has to demit that office.74 Following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, under 
section 1105, the SEC has the power without going to court to issue officer and director 
bars as part of a cease-and-desist proceeding.75 The standard for a bar is unfitness.76 
Caution is necessary in exercising the barring power -- it must be confined to limited time 
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periods rather than lifetime bars, unless there are strong reasons to impose the latter. 
Given the inherent limitations of any system of predicting future behavior, even taking 
account of prior misconduct will ensure that some CEOs will be falsely predicted to have 
the potential for re-offending and will receive unnecessarily long bar orders. These 
individuals will experience undeserved hardship and there will be a net loss of social 
welfare. Yet others will be falsely predicted to be low risk of re-offending and will 
receive short term bars. Such individuals might re-offend and create new victims. Since 
this category is more likely to be the focus of attention, it might explain the view that 
white-collar offenders also have a significant rate of recidivism.77 
 
To conclude, the principal objective of criminalization is to prevent corporate governance 
offenders from committing similar offences and to deter others; the first can be achieved 
by disqualifying them from holding responsible office, the second can be achieved by 
conviction without imprisonment aided by consequential sanctions.78 A third objective is 
to ensure that they do not retain the fruits of their misconduct. This can be achieved by an 
order to disgorge and by clawing back ill-gotten gains. Incarceration does not aid any of 
these purposes. To the extent that retribution is an objective, and is not satisfied by the 
above sanctions, consequential sanctions that inevitably follow conviction ought to 
suffice in any civilized society. This has the added advantage of decentralizing the 
retributive objective and allowing non-state actors to impose punishment. 
 
V. Consequential Sanctions 
 
Conviction inevitably results in consequential sanctions ranging from shaming to legal 
impediments and denial of privileges. As has been previously argued, this is a significant 
burden for corporate governance offenders and contributes to their high disutility of 
conviction alone. If, as can be accepted, one of the objectives of criminalization is to 
socialize offenders and society at large, the shaming element that inevitably accompanies 
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 Cite. 
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 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 453, 471-77 (1997) 
(stating that law can play a role in socialization). 
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criminal conviction might meet that objective without the need for incarceration.79 The 
law could stop at conviction without imposing any punishment because the shame might 
offer sufficient deterrence and retributive advantages.80 Corporate governance offenders 
are likely to experience significant detriment in terms of loss of employment 
opportunities and social exclusion and might internalize the values sought to be conveyed 
by the law even without going to jail.81 Consequential sanctions, which can include 
shaming, withholding of esteem, shunning, and negative voting by investors and other 
market participants, can thus modify behavior in desirable ways.82 Shame-enforcers 
frequently seek to attach negative labels to an offender,83 create a reputation as a bad 
actor,84 label actors as being disloyal to shareholders' interests, exclude those actors from 
other employment involving trust,85 cause economic harm to offenders by seeking 
disgorgement of ill gotten gains, and deprive offenders of any opportunity to hold 
prestigious positions.86 These actions are ultimately aimed at norm internalization by the 
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 Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J. L. & Econ. 520 (1996). 
80
 Id. at 526. (“the penalty might be zero when there is no trial or only probation is given, however, 
stigma still arises merely from arrest; criminal conviction itself generates stigma irrespective of the 
level of sentence.”) 
81
 Id. Some are only satisfied by imprisonment. See, statement of Sen. Byrd: “somebody ought to go to jail, 
and the doors should be locked and the keys thrown away. Throw away the keys. It really would not be too 
severe a punishment for some of these four-flushers.” 148 CONG. REC. S6603, S6606 (daily ed. July 11, 
2002). 
82Studies also show that the ability to express punishment has important implications for cooperative 
behavior.  Astrid Hopfensitz & Ernesto Reuben, The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social 
Punishment (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 05-075/1, July 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=775524, at 17. 
("[I]ndividuals who are willing to punish are also willing to keep on cooperating.  This guaranties that, as 
long as these individuals have the opportunity to punish, cooperation can be sustained.  Furthermore these 
kinds of individuals might help cooperation emerge, even if it was initially rare.  In addition, the same type 
of people is necessary to support punishment in the presence of retaliation.  If retaliation deters individuals 
from using the punishment mechanism, cooperation can unravel."). 
83
 Senator ByrdThe President apparently is so miffed with these corporatewrongdoers that he has elevated 
them in his rhetoric to a bad-guy level that is almost, but not quite as bad, as al-Qaedas evildoers. Almost 
the same level; perhaps not quite. Senate Hearings on PCAOB legislation, See 148 CONG. REC. S6603, 
S6606 (daily ed. July 11, 2002). 
84
 SEC v. Sands, 142 F.3d 1186; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 8093: “Sands, a sophisticated businessman and a 
lawyer, has engaged in numerous activities in violation of the securities laws and basic notions of right and 
wrong. We need not sort out whether his principles are just plain wrong, or whether he is afflicted with 
akrasia.” 
85See call by AFL-CIO for Kenneth Langone, a director of the NYSE board who defended Richard Grasso's 
compensation package, to be dropped from the board of GE and four other public companies. Troy 
Wolverton, AFL-CIO's Throw-the-Bum-Out Call Gets Cool Reception, STREET.COM (Sept. 26, 2003), 
available at http://www.thestreet.com/stocks/troywolverton/10116076.html. 
86
 In SEC v. Sands, 142 F.3d 1186; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 8093, the defendant argued that the bar against 
him holding office as director was against the public interest because it would prevent him from serving on 
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offender and observers. As discussed previously, individuals with high capacity for 
shame are reputation-conscious and incarceration is a waste of resources for such 
actors.87  
 
Norm-internalization for white-collar offenders is enabled by the significant detriment in 
terms of loss of employment opportunities and social exclusion experienced (in other 
words, disutility of conviction). A variant of this idea is captured by Dau-Schmidt, who 
calls it preference-shaping.88 Dau-Schmidt writes that “[p]reference shaping, on an 
individual, organizational, and societal level, is an important human endeavor. It has been 
identified as a primary or secondary goal of childrearing, education, religion, advertising, 
public service announcements, legislation, and criminal punishment. In order to do this, it 
is essential that the person or group of people who are endeavoring to affect another's 
preferences have some legitimate claim to authority over the person, or at least have the 
confidence of the person.”89 I have previously suggested that CEOs are particularly suited 
for desirable behavior modification through the operation of social sanctions because of 
this very feature -- their dependence on approval from diverse constituencies and the 
value placed on reputation.90  
 
Shaming has salience for corporate governance offenders because of their dependence on 
group membership. The targets of shaming are members of professional associations, and 
possess licenses allowing them to carry on certain kinds of economic activity. Frequently, 
these professional licenses and certifications are privileges that can be taken away by the 
                                                                                                                              
the boards of charities. The court responded thus: “Perhaps he is right that charities will not want to place 
him in positions of high visibility and prestige. If so, and if Sands does have a genuine-interest in doing 
charitable works, we are certain that he can continue his charitable involvement in a less prestigious, but 
just as worthy, capacity. We touch on this argument because it underscores the purblindness of Sands...” 
87
 Id. 
88
 Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 
Duke L.J. 1, 14-15 (1990). (If peoples' preferences are compatible, no one's preferences will be frustrated, 
and there will be no need to expend resources on precautionary measures.). Id. at 17. 
89
 See also id. at 18. (“By characterizing a behavior as good or bad rather than just inexpensive or 
expensive, the authority figure indicates need for a fundamental change in the basis upon which the 
affected person makes decisions.”) 
90
 See, Sandeep Gopalan, Changing Social Norms and CEO Pay: The Role of Norms Entrepreneurs, 3 
Rutgers L. J. (2008). 
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relevant authority.91 Such legal impediments to the offender holding offices involving 
trust can be finely calibrated to achieve incapacitation in much the same way that jail 
does.92 Even if impediments are not imposed it is unlikely that the individual will be able 
to find similar employment following conviction. Prestige goods are also likely to be 
denied in non-professional contexts because these offenders are also members of social 
groups which view conviction with distaste.93 Membership conditions and interactions 
after admittance present ideal conditions for deploying shaming as esteem is vital for 
profitable interactions.94 Even if some offenders are not affected by shaming, other 
observers might see the disutility of the alleged offense and modify their behavior.95  
Membership in these groups is intrinsically related to the possession of a good reputation, 
and the gate-keeping function served by these groups might obviate the need for 
incarceration by delivering the same behavioral change.96 
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 SEC v. Sands: “The district court has broad equitable powers to fashion appropriate relief for violations 
of the federal securities laws, which include the power to order an officer and director bar. In addition to 
the court's inherent equitable powers, the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act 
of 199(Remedies Act) authorizes the court to order an officer and director bar if the person's conduct 
demonstrates substantial unfitness to serve as an officer or director. In determining whether to order the 
bar, a court may consider(1) the 'egregiousness' of the underlying securities law violation; (2) the 
defendant's 'repeat offender' status; (3) the defendant's 'role' or position when he engaged in the fraud; (4) 
the defendant's degree of scienter; (5) the defendant's economic stake in the violation; and (6) the likelihood 
that misconduct will recur.” (internal citations omitted) 
92
 SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 19696: “Although it is not essential for a lifetime ban 
that there be past violations, we think that it is essential, in the absence of such violations, that a district 
court articulate the factual basis for a finding of the likelihood of recurrence. We take note of the fact that 
the governing statute provides that a bar on service as an officer or director that is based on substantial 
unfitness may be imposed conditionally or unconditionally and permanently or for such period of time as 
[the court] -shall determine. Before imposing a permanent bar, the court should consider whether a 
conditional bar (e.g., a bar limited to a particular industry) and/or a bar limited in time (e.g., a bar of five 
years) might be sufficient, especially where there is no prior history of unfitness.  We do not think that it 
would be improper for the district court to take into account any prior punishment that may have been 
imposed in a criminal proceeding. If the district court decides that a conditional ban or a ban limited in time 
is not warranted, it should give reasons why a lifetime injunction is imposed.” 
93
 Cite. 
94Jonathan Macey, Delaware: Home of the World's Most Expensive Raincoat, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1131, 
1134 (2005) (Directors "do not like to be made the object of public scorn and ridicule."). 
95Dan Kahan, What do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 639 (1996).  Prof. Kahan 
argues that shaming has the effect of shaping preferences.  If individuals are shamed for contravening a 
particular asserted norm, other observers will modify their own behavior to fit that asserted norm. 
96See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms and the Unintended 
Consequences of Independence and Accountability 25 (Georgetown Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 
241,402, Sept. 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=241402 (Media coverage makes directors fear 
liability even more than they ought to: "[H]ypothesis is that under certain predictable circumstances, 
executives will overestimate the risk of liability.  There are a number of possible reasons.  One is that 
newspapers and business periodicals highlight dramatic instances of such suits, and hence the threat of 
liability.")  See also Alexander Dyck, & Luigi Zingales, The Corporate Governance Role of the Media, in 
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Corporate governance offenders have a variety of agents who can impose shaming and 
other social sanctions including investors, other directors, employees, the media, 
politicians, and potential employers. Their position relative to the offender reduces the 
risk of retaliation by the offender and facilitates internalization.97 Indeed, certain shamers 
like courts are completely immune from retaliation.98 They also possess significant 
advantages over other shamers.99 Firstly, they have authority conferred by law. Unlike 
other shamers, the offender is in a decidedly inferior position to the court at every level. 
Secondly, the court’s findings have certain other positive attributes derived from the legal 
process.100 One of these attributes is legitimacy.101 Another is finality. After the appeals 
process is exhausted, the verdict of the court is final, and any shame that follows cannot 
be changed.  
 
Shame-targets can respond to shaming with anger and contempt at the shamers.102 
Conviction serves as a focal point for shaming in that it emboldens individuals to impose 
social sanctions. Collective opinion concretizes around the conviction and holds out the 
offender as an object of shame. Those who were afraid or hesitant to shame previously 
draw strength from the conviction. This is because doubt about the guilt of the offender is 
                                                                                                                              
THE RIGHT TO TELL: THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN DEVELOPMENT (R. Islam ed., The World Bank, 
Washington DC, 2002) (writing that corporate executives act appropriately because they do not want to be 
portrayed by the media as "the bad guys"). 
97
 Astrid Hopfensitz Ernesto Reuben, The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social 
Punishment (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 05-075/1, July 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=775524, at 17. 
(“If retaliation deters individuals from using the punishment mechanism, cooperation can unravel.”). 
98
 Id. 
99
 Certain shamers like politicians appear to have little effect on those they seek to shame. During the 
Senate Hearings on the PCAOB, Sen. Byrd said “one finds disconcerting the acute lack of shame--the acute 
lack of shame--S-H-A-M-E--on the part of some of these corporate executives. Former Enron CEO Jeffrey 
Skilling told the House Energy and Commerce Oversight Subcommittee that Enron had tight controls on 
financial risk, but that he could not be expected to oversee everything and 'close out the cash drawers ... 
every night.' Can you imagine that kind of statement? I think it was Wordsworth who said ‘No matter how 
high you are in your department, you are responsible for what the lowliest clerk is doing...’” See 148 
CONG. REC. S6603, S6606 (daily ed. July 11, 2002). 
100
 Cite. 
101
 Cite. 
102
 Contempt and indignation by the offender are often counterproductive. For e.g., Sen. Byrd had this to 
say about Skilling’s testimony to a House committee: “here is an individual who tells a House committee 
he cannot be expected to oversee everything and close out the cash drawers every night…such a stunning, 
irresponsible, arrogant attitude on the part of a chief executive…” Supra note __. 
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largely removed by the court’s verdict. Indignation and anger-based responses by the 
offender are less likely to be tolerated following conviction than before. If the focal point 
created by the conviction yields effective follow-up shaming by other actors, it serves to 
reinforce the message and yield sticky norm-internalization.103  
 
Shaming meshes neatly with the corporate governance crime debate because it addresses 
the expressive gap in legal sanctions.104  Imprisonment and financial sanctions are crude 
in their application and do not serve to convey the emotions aroused by the actions of 
corporate offenders.  Frequently, for most indirect, non-dangerous offenses, all that 
society wants is that these emotions be ventilated, and for the offender to be prevented 
from re-offending, rather than to see the offender go to jail or be made to suffer financial 
loss. In the Skilling-type case, what is the point of sending the excessively optimistic 
CEO to jail or imposing a fine? Civilized society recognizes that their conduct is not 
worthy of jail-time, and that fines are crude matches for their actions. Any sanction, if it 
has to be meaningful and reflective of a sophisticated system, must match the message 
that society is trying to convey to the offender, and be proportional to the offense. 
Imprisoning Skilling for 292 months then is an inappropriate tool for what society really 
wants to do. Conviction ought to suffice because it serves the expressive function of the 
law insofar as it tells the offender that he has acted in a way that meets with society's 
disapproval, and conveys the consequences of such conduct to other observers. It leaves 
other consequences to individual members to administer. 
 
I have written in previous work about the need for internalization of the underlying norm 
if shaming is to work.105 If offenders charged with violating accounting rules do not 
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 See, Sandeep Gopalan, Social Norms and CEO Pay: The Role of Norms Entrepreneurs, 39 Rutgers L. J. 
(2008). 
104Chad Flanders, On Shaming Punishments, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. P.4 (2007): “The law does not exist 
merely to allocate benefits and burdens; it also says things through its actions.. . . . It is not as if society 
punishes by inflicting suffering and then stating in words that it does not approve of the offender’s conduct. 
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crimes because it wants to condemn those crimes in no uncertain terms. This is to say that, conventionally, 
hard treatment is society’s way of expressing disapproval of criminal acts. Words alone are not good 
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 Sandeep Gopalan, Changing Social Norms and CEO Pay: The Role of Norms Entrepreneurs, 39 Rutgers 
L.J. 1 (2007). 
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believe that their conduct was wrongful, they are likely to be angered by the imposition 
of a shame sanction rather than feel remorse.  Even if they change their actions following 
the shaming because they realize the disutility created, this is unlikely to be sustainable. 
Resentment and anger are likely to motivate them to find new ways to break the rules. 
This could be partially addressed by incapacitating them from holding similar positions 
of trust through the use of legal impediments. 
 
I have also discussed, in previous work,106 the various objections to shaming, and do not 
regurgitate those arguments here except to address one objection – the lack of process 
protections.107 This line of scholarship contends that the lack of process might lead to 
shame sanctions being imposed on the innocent. Further, there is no architecture to make 
the amount of shame proportional to the wrong committed by the offender resulting in 
over-shaming or under-shaming. In some cases, it might inflict too much and irreversible 
punishment.108 In addition, those undertaking the shaming are not subject to any 
accountability mechanisms.109 While these objections have some merit, they can be 
overcome to a significant degree here because shaming is consequent upon a 
determination of blameworthiness by a court. This protects against the political 
deployment of shame sanctions.  Trade unions and employee groups might have self-
interested reasons to target CEOs.  What is criminal conduct to a left-wing trade union 
might not be so for many other market participants and the deployment of shame 
sanctions based on political ideologies could be a threat to their efficacy. Similarly, the 
media could engage in witch hunts without undertaking significant effort to establish 
guilt. If, however, shaming follows conviction, or results from a finding of guilt by a 
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Constitutional Law, 140 U. PS. L. REV. 1, 5-12 (1991). 
108
 The suicide of a prosecutor who allegedly solicited a person he believed to be 13 years of age following 
a Dateline NBC sting is a sobering reminder of the dangerous consequences. See, Tim Eaton, Prosecutor 
Kills Himself in Texas Raid Over Child Sex, New York Times, November 6, 2006, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/07/us/07pedophile.html?ex=1320555600&en=9a849fc4db0d28ce&ei=50
88&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss. 
109
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regulatory agency, professional association or a stock exchange, much of the due process 
problem can be negated.  
 
VI. Skilling’s Case 
At the peak of its success, Enron was “The World’s Leading Energy Company,” and an 
iconic symbol of American capitalism. In just the span of a decade it had undergone 
enormous transformation - in 1990, Enron was primarily a pipeline company, with 3,000 
employees, a market capitalization of $3 billion, and revenues of about $5 billion. By 
1999, it had 18,000 employees, offices in 30 countries, a market capitalization of $22 
billion, and revenues over $40 billion— almost 90% of which came from Jeff Skilling’s 
Wholesale business. During this period of time, Enron’s shareholders received almost 
500% return on their investment. This transformation was widely acclaimed. Amongst its 
many awards, Enron was lauded as Fortune’s “Most Innovative Company in America” 
for four years on the trot. 
 
All this collapsed in an extraordinary sequence of events that was said to epitomize 
corporate corruption at its worst. Consequences for Enron’s employees and the city of 
Houston were drastic. On “Black Monday,” over 4,000 Houston Enron employees lost 
their jobs. Thousands more had to seek other employment during the course of the 
following months, until the company, once Houston’s largest employer, had only enough 
employees to administer the bankruptcy. Enron stock plummeted to its nadir, rendering 
many employees’ 401(k) accounts worthless. Savings accumulated over lifetimes were 
rendered nought. When the trial of Skilling and Lay commenced, it became apparent that 
several jurors knew someone—family, friends, neighbors, co-workers, clients, fellow 
churchgoers—who was harmed by Enron’s collapse.110 Many jurors had suffered 
financial losses to the tune of thousands of dollars.111 In their responses, several jurors 
noted “the far reaching impact on the business community,” the “extremely negative 
impact on [Houston’s] charitable and arts organizations,” and the damage to “Houston[’s] 
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real estate market.”112  
 
Through 1996, Jeff Skilling headed Enron’s Wholesale business, which he founded in 
1990 as its first and only employee. In 1997, Skilling became Enron’s President and 
Chief Operating Officer, and joined the Board of Directors. In February 2001, he was 
appointed Enron’s CEO. On August 14, 2001, in an end to his meteoric career, he 
resigned from the company. Skilling was indicted in 2004 along with former Enron 
Chairman and CEO Ken Lay, and former Enron Chief Accounting Officer Richard 
Causey. On December 28, 2005, just weeks before trial, Causey pled guilty to one count 
of securities fraud.113 Skilling and Lay’s trial began in Houston on January 30, 2006. On 
May 25, the jury convicted Skilling on 19 counts: one count of conspiracy to commit 
securities or wire fraud114; 12 counts of securities fraud115; five counts of false statements 
to auditors116; and one count of insider trading117. He was acquitted on nine counts of 
insider trading.118 Thereafter, Skilling was sentenced to 292 months in prison, and 
ordered to pay $45 million in restitution.119 Crucially to my argument about moral 
wrongfulness and harm, Skilling was charged not with causing the bankruptcy, but 
misrepresenting Enron’s financial condition during the 1999-2001 before he stepped 
down from his position as the CEO. 
 
It is also important to note that unlike the other bete noire, Andrew Fastow, Skilling was 
not accused of stealing from Enron. Further, the trial showed that Fastow by his own 
admission had concealed his thefts from Skilling. Given the nature of Skilling’s 
personality and marriage to Enron’s success, there was no case that Skilling had 
sabotaged the company’s interests to benefit his own. The Enron Task Force, which had 
been set up to investigate and bring to justice those who were responsible for Enron’s 
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collapse did not deny that Skilling “loved the company,” “was very committed” and 
“dedicated” to it, and “had the best interests of Enron in mind.”120 
 
Despite these facts, the indictment alleged that, starting in late 1999, Skilling spearheaded 
a massive conspiracy to deceive investors about Enron’s financial health, by 
manipulating the company’s financial results and lying about the performance of its 
businesses.121 The indictment alleged that this conspiracy included almost 125 people 
from Enron’s senior management to entry level employees to professionals at several 
establishments in the legal, banking, and finance sectors.122 The Task Force contended 
that the conspiracy’s objective had been to pump up Enron’s stock price artificially—by 
regularly reporting financial information that met or exceeded Wall Street analysts’ 
expectations, trumpeting Enron’s successes, and concealing its failures.123  
 
The indictment alleged that Skilling and his co-conspirators engaged in five areas of 
fraud: 1.LJM: which involved a special purpose entity, whose general partner was Enron 
CFO Andrew Fastow, where they manufactured earnings and hid losses through 
fraudulent transactions;124 2. Reserves: where they manipulated reserve accounts 
allegedly by raiding reserves in one quarter, and taking extra reserves in another, to report 
earnings that exceeded or met with analysts’ expectations;125 3.Wholesale: where they 
misrepresented the nature of the business as a “logistics company” that yielded stable, 
sustainable earnings, when it was really a risky “trading company” whose profits 
depended on speculative bets on energy prices. The government alleged that spin-
doctoring Wholesale as a “logistics company” made a difference to how the market 
valued it. Allegedly, Skilling was alive to this fact and did tell Ken Rice, EBS’s CEO, 
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 Fastow testified: “at Enron the culture was and the business practice seemed to consistently be to do 
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that the stock would “get whacked” if the fact that it was a risky trading company was 
apparent to the market.126 The government also alleged that Skilling shifted losses from 
other divisions to Wholesale in order to convey the appearance that they were financially 
sound, when they were not, so as to attract further investment127 ; 4.Retail/EES (Enron 
Energy Services): where they concealed the failure of the Retail business by using a 
“resegmentation” to shift Retail’s losses into Wholesale, then stating EES was “firmly on 
track.”128 EES was created by Enron to sell natural gas to customers in deregulated 
markets. It belied its initial expectations of being profitable and was struggling 
financially. The problems were compounded by the distress faced by Californian utility 
companies which owed EES substantial amounts, and which had already been booked as 
profits under the mark-to-market accounting rules.129 When the utilities did not pay up in 
late 2000, the government alleges that instead of booking several hundreds of millions in 
losses pursuant to the accounting rules, Skilling conspired to hide the losses in 
Wholesale.130 This ensured that EES continued to smell of roses. Similarly, in March 
2001, EES’s losses were buried in Wholesale following the California energy crisis when 
the California Public Utilities Commission imposed a surcharge which could not be 
passed on to customers.131 This hurt Enron to the tune of hundreds of millions of 
dollars.132 Notwithstanding these machinations, EES’s financial condition did not 
improve and its losses in 2001 alone exceeded $700 million;133 and 5. Broadband/EBS: 
where they allegedly concealed the failure of the Broadband business by falsely stating it 
was “healthy” and “growing fast”.134 As is evident at first blush, the statements at issue 
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were remarkably like puffery, rather than criminal fraud.135 In some cases they were bad 
business decisions based on hindsight, but were they worthy of imprisonment?136 
 
The government also alleged that Skilling made misrepresentations to investors during 
several conference calls.137 The relevant ones are: 
 
January 22, 2001 - Skilling told investors: “the situation in California had little impact on 
fourth quarter results. Let me repeat that. For Enron, the situation in California had little 
impact on fourth quarter results.”138 Further, “nothing can happen in California that 
would jeopardize” earnings targets.139 The government claimed that at the time of these 
statements, Skilling knew that the California utilities were not in a position to pay Enron 
and that a loss of hundreds of millions of dollars would have to be booked.140 Allegedly, 
at this call, Skilling was a mute bystander when Mark Koenig, Enron’s Director of 
Investor Relations, stated that non-core business revenues were a “fairly small” amount 
of EBS’s earnings.141 The government contends that this was false.142 
 
January 25, 2001: Skilling told Enron’s annual analysts conference that EES and EBS 
had “sustainable high earnings power.”143 He also claimed that Wholesale was “not a 
trading business. We are a logistics company.”144  
 
March 23, 2001, following news on the market that EBS was in dire straits, and Enron’s 
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falling stock price, Skilling convened a special conference call with analysts. He claimed 
that EBS was “having a great quarter” and that Enron was “highly confident” that EES 
would meet its earning target.145 The government alleges that Skilling knew this was not 
true.146 
 
April 17, 2001, Skilling told another conference call that the transfer of EES’s risk-
management books to Wholesale was because there was “such capacity in our wholesale 
business that we’re—we just weren’t taking advantage of that in managing our portfolio 
at the retail side. And this retail portfolio has gotten so big so fast that we needed to get 
the best—the best hands working on risk management there.”147 The government alleges 
that the motivation was to conceal losses. During the call, Skilling also said that the “first 
quarter results were great” at EES, despite them being down, and with regard to EBS, 
claimed that there was a very strong development of the marketplace in the 
commoditization of bandwidth …we’re feeling very good about the development of this 
business.”148 
 
July 17, 2001: Skilling stated that EES “had an outstanding second quarter” and was 
“firmly on track to achieve” earnings targets, despite EES posting a loss of hundreds of 
millions of dollars.149 He again claimed that EES’s reorganization was undertaken for 
efficiency reasons (not to hide losses as alleged by the government).150 
 
Skilling also allegedly raided the reserve accounts flush from Wholesale’s profitable 
second half of 2000 - which had allowed it to put over $850 million in reserves.151 The 
government contends that the decision to put the funds into reserves was not based on 
feared potential liabilities, but rather to use it instrumentally to manipulate earnings.152 
Skilling allegedly used it to hit a specific earnings target to meet Wall Street 
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expectations.153 The government also argued that Skilling was aware of Enron’s SEC 
filings containing false statements, including the wrong recognition of money from the 
Nigerian barges deal as legitimate income despite the fact that it was not really a sale.154 
In addition, it was alleged that Enron misled Arthur Andersen by giving them 
management-representation letters knowing them to be false, thus undermining the 
auditing process.155 In particular, these representations claimed that all related party 
transactions were disclosed when they were not.156 
 
In terms of the mental element required for conviction, the conspiracy count required that 
Skilling “knew the unlawful purpose of the agreement.”157 The securities fraud counts 
required that he “knowingly” engaged in a “fraud or deceit.”158 The false statements to 
auditors counts required that Skilling “knowingly” made materially false statements or 
omitted material facts.159 Finally, the insider trading counts required that he “knowingly 
employed a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” by trading on inside information.160 
None of these were directly proved through documentary evidence.  
 
Instead, the prosecution based its case on self-serving testimony provided by witnesses 
who had everything to gain by pinning blame on Skilling for what were, at worst, bad 
business judgments.161 During the trial, Skilling’s defense was that he did not break any 
laws, and that his actions were undertaken as a loyal employee of Enron.162 He also 
claimed that he had always relied on competent legal and accounting advice.163 With 
regard to the statements made during the calls to analysts, Skilling claimed that these 
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were immaterial. Most importantly, Skilling attacked the reliability of the government’s 
key witnesses - Fastow and Glisan. Fastow’s testimony is the most problematic – it 
claimed that he and Skilling had a secret understanding about Cuiaba and the Nigerian 
barges — which Fastow referred to as “bear hugs.”164 Skilling contended that these were 
self-serving interpretations made by Fastow.165 
 
Following the trial, in May 2006, the jury found Skilling guilty of nineteen counts: one 
count of conspiracy, twelve counts of securities fraud, five counts of making false 
statements, and one count of insider trading. Skilling won a minor victory by being 
acquitted of nine counts of insider trading.166 Ken Lay also met a harsh fate and was 
convicted of every count against him.167 The district court sentenced Skilling to 292 
months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, and $45 million in restitution. 
 
As is apparent, the sheer size of a company like Enron necessitates the creation of large 
sub-structures comprising of several layers of subordinates, governance systems, and 
internal and outside advisors to ensure the proper structuring and vetting of business 
transactions and decisions. It is upon these substructures that CEOs and senior executives 
turn to for most of the decisions that they are required to make. They act upon the basis 
of the advice provided by these processes, and the success of any company is owed in 
substantial measure to the efficacy of these decision-making systems. It is indeed rare for 
CEOs to run companies the size of Enron as personal fiefdoms where every decision is 
made on their own accord and without consultation with and reliance on advisors, 
internal and external. It is also not typical that CEOs, actively seek out personal 
accounting or legal advice in addition to those offered by these substructures. It makes 
sense then for them to rely on expert advice, and for such reliance to be useful in showing 
that they did not possess the required knowledge or intent to engage in criminal conduct.  
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Enron and Skilling were no different in terms of consultation and reliance. Skilling had 
been advised that the Raptors transactions,168 for example, had been reviewed and 
approved by Andersen’s technical accounting group in Chicago.169 His decision to 
support the structures was based on presentations made to him and to the full Board, 
which had voted to approve them. Skilling’s testimony showed that he was never told 
that the vehicles were improper.170 As one senior prosecuting lawyer wrote, [i]n a trial 
involving allegations of earnings manipulation and disputes over the defendants' 
respective understandings of the application of often arcane accounting rules, proof of 
criminal intent was of critical importance. Assembling such evidence proved challenging, 
however, as both Skilling and Lay clearly relied on the advice of inside and outside 
counsel, as well as their auditors.”171 This was to be of no avail. 
 
The Task Force's case against Skilling was predicated primarily on the testimony of 
cooperating witnesses, who had all agreed to testify in exchange for leniency and 
favorable sentencing recommendations.172 In addition, there is some substance to the 
feeling that witnesses who could have provided exculpatory testimony for Skilling were 
intimidated by the Task Force with threats of indictment.173 Throughout the trial, there 
was no other direct evidence that linked Skilling with the alleged crimes. 
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The duplicity of the prosecution can be seen in one simple instance involving document 
destruction – the very basis for the government ringing the death knell for Arthur 
Andersen. Skilling had moved for an order requiring the production of the raw interview 
notes of Andrew Fastow’s examination by the government in order to determine how 
much of what was produced had been massaged to support their case. In response, the 
Task Force refused to produce the notes, and in a bizarre move claimed that it had 
destroyed all the materials including the electronic files from computer hard drives. How 
was this different from the document destruction engaged in by Arthur Andersen? 
Clearly, the Task Force had destroyed the electronic copies in an attempt to prevent 
Skilling from attacking the credibility of Fastow, and in an attempt at gaining an unfair 
advantage in the trial. The difference between aggressive prosecution and obstruction of 
justice is equally thin here. 
 
1. Deliberate Ignorance 
 
A further taint on the prosecution was the employment of the “deliberate ignorance” 
doctrine to get over the minor problem of Skilling believing that his actions were legal.174 
In United States v. Heredia, the court justified the use of the doctrine stating that 
“’knowingly’ in criminal statutes is not limited to positive knowledge, but includes the 
state of mind of one who does not possess positive knowledge only because he 
consciously avoided it.”175 In another case, the court concluded that to “constru[e] 
knowingly in a criminal statute to include willful blindness to the existence of a fact is no 
radical concept in the law.”176 Key to the doctrine is that the conduct of the defendant 
“denotes a conscious effort to avoid positive knowledge of a fact which is an element of 
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an offense charged … choosing to remain ignorant so he can plead lack of positive 
knowledge in the event he should be caught.”177 In order to apply the doctrine, the 
conduct must be “Don’t tell me, I don’t want to know.”178 Given its broad sweep, courts 
have repeatedly emphasized that it should only be given “in the “rare” instance where 
there is significant evidence of deliberate ignorance.”179 The concern has been that 
“[b]ecause the instruction permits a jury to convict a defendant without a finding that the 
defendant was actually aware of the existence of illegal conduct, the deliberate ignorance 
instruction poses the risk that a jury might convict the defendant on a lesser negligence 
standard - the defendant should have been aware of the illegal conduct.”180 
This is dangerous territory. There is a clear distinction between failing to ascertain 
information about a fact, and knowing the fact. If the former equals the latter, there is 
little sense in requiring the prosecution to prove knowledge. It dilutes the requirements of 
knowledge to breaking point. As the court noted in United States v. Mendoza-Medina, 
“the deliberate ignorance instruction poses the risk that a jury might convict the 
defendant on a lesser negligence standard – the defendant should have been aware of the 
illegal conduct.”181 Even setting aside the serious problems with the doctrine, its 
application in this case does not satisfy the conditions that are required to be fulfilled. In 
order to apply the doctrine, two conditions must be satisfied: “1. the defendant was 
subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of the illegal conduct; 2. the 
defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning of the illegal conduct.”182 Further, 
subjective awareness of illegal activity and purposeful contrivance to avoid learning of 
illegal conduct can be inferred from the defendant’s inactivity in the face of a “routine 
and repeated pattern of suspicious transactions.” 183 As the 5th circuit court stressed, 
“where there is no such evidence, a district court should not give the instruction because 
there is no basis for finding deliberate ignorance. In such a case, it is usually harmful, 
because it is likely to lead the jury to find that the defendant had the requisite knowledge 
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when he in fact did not.”184  
 
Is deliberate ignorance even possible in a corporation the size of Enron with its army of 
lawyers, accountants and consultants? Expert advice is routinely provided and there is no 
evidence that Skilling deliberately sought to avoid getting advice when he should have. 
There are few facts which justify the conclusion that there was a pattern of suspicious 
transactions that ought to have caused Skilling to act. Skilling’s case had never been that 
he did not know the facts. His case was that his actions were not illegal. As the 5th circuit 
put it, “[h]e claims that he “agreed” at trial with the government’s characterization of him 
as knowing everything that went on at Enron. He maintains that his “defense was not that 
he was unaware of fraud, but that there was no fraud.”185 This strikes at the root of the 
deliberate ignorance ground because if he had full knowledge of the actions but did not 
believe them to be illegal, there is no case. There is obviously no need to contrive to 
avoid finding out about legal facts. Having come this far, the 5th circuit gets it horribly 
wrong: “Even if Skilling is correct that there is little evidence to support a deliberate 
ignorance instruction, however, any error in the district court’s decision to give the 
instruction was harmless. This is because the peril to be avoided in cases reversing 
convictions based on the deliberate ignorance instruction is not present here. By his own 
admission, Skilling claims that he knew of the allegedly illegal acts, so there is no risk 
that a jury would rely on the deliberate ignorance instruction to find that he should have 
known of the acts. Consequently, even if the district court erred in giving the deliberate 
ignorance instruction in the sense that the instruction was “not supported by evidence,” 
any such error was necessarily harmless.”186 
 
This is a terrible travesty. The court completely confuses Skilling’s case – he did not 
contend that he knew the acts were illegal.187 Rather, the claim was that he knew of the 
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acts, which were all legal!188 
 
Skilling appealed, contending inter alia, that the government used an invalid theory of 
“honest-services fraud” to convict him. The jury had convicted Skilling of one count of 
conspiracy. The problem was that it did not specify which object of the conspiracy had 
been used to convict and given that one of them was honest services, Skilling sought to 
overturn the conviction alleging that this was an invalid theory.189  
 
2. Honest Services 
The government’s case against Skilling under this theory was based on a conspiracy to 
deceive investors about the true performance of Enron’s businesses by cooking the books 
to increase reported earnings, reduce reported losses, maintain an investment-grade credit 
rating, and improve the price of Enron’s stock. In doing so, Skilling allegedly breached 
his fiduciary duty of “honest services.”190 The truth is that Skilling’s conviction is 
founded on no evidence as to when, how, or why the conspiracy was hatched, or anything 
beyond self-serving testimony from Fastow claiming that he committed any crime. The 
conviction chillingly demonstrates the need to clarify the “honest services” theory if it is 
to serve any function in distinguishing risky business behavior from criminal behavior. 
 
In US v. Brown,191 the government’s “honest services” theory was rejected by the court in 
similar circumstances. In Brown, Enron and Merrill Lynch employees were alleged to 
have engaged in a conspiracy to defraud Enron and its shareholders by “parking” the now 
infamous “Nigerian barges” with Merrill Lynch for six months to artificially boost 
Enron’s earnings.192 It was alleged that Merrill paid $7 million to acquire equity in the 
barges to help Enron post $12 million in earnings to meet its forecasts.193 The state’s case 
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was that this was a sham transaction because Enron executives orally promised Merrill a 
flat fee of $250,000 and a guaranteed 15% annual rate of return for the six months that it 
was required to hold the asset.194 Further, the government alleged that the transaction was 
in the nature of a lease rather than a sale because Enron executives promised it would 
buyback Merrill’s interest if no third party could be found.195 The court was 
unsympathetic to the government’s claims because the facts did not show that the 
defendants had acted at the expense of the company, or had engaged in bribery and self-
dealing.196 Rather, their actions were to the benefit of Enron. According to the majority, 
“[w]e do not presume that it is in a corporation’s legitimate interests ever to misstate 
earnings – it is not. However, where an employer intentionally aligns the interests of the 
employee with a specified corporate goal, where the employee perceives its pursuit of 
that goal as mutually benefiting him and his employer, and where the employee’s conduct 
is consistent with that perception of the mutual interest, such conduct is beyond the reach 
of the honest-services theory of fraud as it has hitherto been applied.”197 
 
The test for a deprivation of “honest services” case, which is laid down in Rybicki,198 is 
that the defendant is secretly acting for his own interest while purporting to act for the 
employer. This is consistent with the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in United States v. 
Bloom.199  
 
There is no evidence that Skilling engaged in bribery or self dealing. Nor did he act 
secretly for his own benefit at the expense of Enron. There was no deprivation of “honest 
services” because, if anything, Skilling’s interests were too closely aligned with Enron’s. 
Unless the causal link between Enron’s ultimate collapse and Skilling’s alleged 
actions are conclusively established, the harm was not directly caused by Skilling’s 
alleged crimes. In fact, the immediate consequences of Skilling’s actions were that Enron 
and its shareholders benefited. The government sought to distinguish Skilling’s case from 
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Brown contending that he “violated his fiduciary obligations and his duty to provide 
Enron and its shareholders with honest services by setting an improper corporate goal – 
improperly maintaining and increasing Enron’s share price and maintaining its credit 
rating – and then scheming to achieve that goal by committing, directing, and causing 
others to commit a series of fraudulent actions that Skilling could not have perceived as 
being consistent with any legitimate corporate interest.”200 They also allege that in Brown 
the offenders were “low-level” employees who were acting on orders from superiors 
whereas Skilling was not acting in pursuance of goals imposed on him by those above 
him.201  
 
The 5th circuit analyzed Brown as creating the following ingredients for establishing 
liability: “when an employer (1) creates a particular goal, (2) aligns the employees’ 
interests with the employer’s interest in achieving that goal, and (3) has higher-level 
management sanction improper conduct to reach the goal, then lower-level employees 
following their boss’s direction are not liable for honest-services fraud.” 202 The 
employees in Brown were acting both in the corporate interest and at the direction of 
their employer, justifying the reversal of their conviction. Thereafter, the court 
manufactured an exception for honest services fraud thus: “In essence, Brown created an 
exception for honest-services fraud where an employer not only aligns its interests with 
the interests of its employees but also sanctions the fraudulent conduct, i.e., where the 
corporate decisionmakers, who supervised the employees being prosecuted, specifically 
authorized the activity.”203 
 
By their own logic, the employer – Enron - should sanction the fraudulent conduct and 
the decisionmaker – Skilling – should have specifically authorized the activity. Given the 
facts of the case, this might be a bridge too far. Nevertheless, the 5th circuit would have 
none of it: “Skilling misconstrues our holding in Brown … because he fails to recognize 
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the manner in which the court in Brown explicitly distinguished Gray… Gray204 and 
Brown present different facts; in Gray, the basketball coaches acted on their own volition, 
without any direction from their supervisors, while in Brown, a lower-level Enron 
employee acted at the direction of Fastow, who as a decisionmaker had the authority to 
tell his employee that Enron sanctioned the particular fraud in question. The difference is 
that in Brown, the employee undertook the specific fraud in question at the direction of 
the employer, while this did not occur in Gray. In essence, because the Enron 
decisionmaker in Brown sanctioned the specific fraudulent conduct of its employee, the 
employee (and the other conspirators) did not deprive Enron of its honest services. Thus, 
for example, had the basketball coaches in Gray showed that the President of Baylor 
University or other decisionmakers specifically directed their fraudulent conduct, then 
they would not have been liable for honest-services fraud.”205 
 
Having come up with this sword, the court then foisted Skilling on it. It said, “Skilling’s 
convictions must stand. First, Enron created a goal of meeting certain earnings 
projections. Second, Enron aligned its interests with Skilling’s personal interests, e.g., 
through his compensation structure, leading Skilling to undertake fraudulent means to 
achieve the goal. Third—and fatally to Skilling’s argument—no one at Enron sanctioned 
Skilling’s improper conduct. That is, Skilling does not allege that the Board of Directors 
or any other decisionmaker specifically directed the improper means that he undertook to 
achieve his goals. Of course, a senior executive cannot wear his “executive” hat to 
sanction a fraudulent scheme and then wear his “employee” hat to perpetuate that fraud. 
Therefore, it is not a matter of Skilling setting the corporation’s policy himself. Instead, 
the question is whether anyone who supervised Skilling specifically directed his 
actions—such as how Fastow sanctioned the scheme in Brown. Skilling never alleged 
that he engaged in his conduct at the explicit direction of anyone, and therefore he cannot 
avail himself of the exception from Brown.”206 
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There is one problem: where is the “fraudulent” action undertaken by Skilling to achieve 
the corporate goal of achieving earnings? There is too facile an assumption of fraud and 
impropriety without the evidence to back it up. The application of the honest services 
theory in cases where bad business decisions caused financial losses dangerously 
corrodes the very basis of criminal liability by conflating moral wrongfulness with risk 
taking. It must be clarified if it has to serve the intended purpose. Further, even upon the 
court’s reasoning, would it not be possible to believe that the board of directors, whose 
task it was to supervise Skilling, sub silentio directed and approved his actions? 
 
As the above analysis shows, there is little morally wrongful in Skilling’s conduct.207 
There was no suggestion that Skilling had anything to gain at the expense of Enron by his 
alleged crimes. In fact, all the evidence pointed to Skilling working for the success of 
Enron. His alleged misstatements were in the nature of sales talk, and puffery and there is 
no evidence that there was any intention to deceive. The Skilling case demonstrates the 
perils of letting the notion of harm alone dictate criminalization. The enormous harm 
suffered by people in Houston appears to have colored their perceptions about the moral 
wrongfulness of Skilling’s actions. If Skilling was indeed responsible for the harm, there 
were other avenues like civil suits to recover for the harm caused. The criminal law ought 
to require more than mere harm to deprive individuals of their liberty. If Skilling has to 
suffer the fate of a murderer who has killed five people (based on his sentence), surely 
there must be the same degree of moral wrongfulness to his actions? 
 
To sum up, Skilling’s conduct was at worst an aggressive interpretation of existing law. 
The government did not adduce any evidence that he intentionally committed acts that he 
knew to be wrong. It is arguable that overly optimistic and egregiously risky actions 
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ought not to be viewed kindly by the law and that CEOs who are guilty of these faults 
should not be allowed to hold similar positions. If, such conduct has to be criminalized 
upon the justification that non-consenting individuals were harmed, conviction without 
imprisonment could achieve the purposes of criminalization at lower cost. Skilling would 
have had his earning capacity destroyed by conviction alone. An order of disgorgement 
would have reduced him to penury. To the extent that it is necessary, other legal 
impediments could have been imposed on him by regulatory agencies. In addition, if 
members of society wanted to impose other consequential sanctions, they could do so 
upon conviction without sending him to jail.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
Criminalizing risky actions undertaken by corporate fiduciaries confuses ex post harm 
with moral wrongfulness. The scholarly and policy-making communities conflate 
blameworthiness with imprisonment, explaining the inordinate focus on ratcheting up 
prison terms. Such a view assumes that physical confinement is essential to achieving the 
objectives of criminalization when the particular nature of corporate governance 
offenders facilitates the realization of those objectives without the need for imprisonment. 
To the extent that criminalization is necessary, the societal goals that the law articulates 
through the criminal law can be realized through conviction alone without the need for 
imprisonment. Conviction is sufficiently liberty-depriving for corporate governance 
offenders insofar as it destroys the ability to hold fiduciary positions eliminating the 
possibility for further social harm. The disutility caused by conviction alone is a 
sufficient deterrent. If the law stops at conviction, deterrent objectives can be achieved 
without the need for the state to bear the cost of imprisonment. The possibility of 
imposing consequential sanctions satisfies the retributive dimension. Lastly, the 
incapacitation objective is achieved by legal impediments to holding offices involving 
trust.  
 
The criminal law is a blunt instrument when applied to problems created by agency costs 
because of the crudeness of traditional sanctions and their relatively high cost without 
demonstrable gain. Further, since corporate governance wrongs are not always morally 
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wrong the criminal law’s expressive and coercive powers are seriously undermined by 
the crude application of criminal sanctions. Stopping at conviction without automatic 
imprisonment minimizes the erosion of expressive power by facilitating the deployment 
of consequential sanctions like shaming, which allows for the decentralized enforcement 
of the asserted norms. Thus, conviction without incarceration offers a second-best 
alternative to decriminalization. 
